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The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention under 
Traditional International Law 
 
Abstract. The necessity and usefulness of a thorough examination of the legality of 
humanitarian intervention under traditional international law is obvious. Following the analysis 
of customary law, the teachings of contemporary international lawyers, the relevant treaty 
stipulations, the doctrine of bellum iustum, the general principles of international law, and the 
ius ad bellum one may come to realize that a definitive conclusion on the issue simply cannot 
be derived, as both pro and contra views are verifiable, but neither is absolutely correct.  
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I.  
 
In order to be able to examine the topic set down in the title, a definition of 
humanitarian intervention valid for the period of traditional international law–
that is to say, the era between the 17th century1 and the adoption of the Charter 
of the United Nations (UN) in 1945–has to be constructed. Since such definition 
does not stand, and has never stood at disposal in positive international law, 
it has to be assembled with taking into account the contemporary body of 
opinion concerning humanitarian intervention, with special regard to the 
common or at least repeatedly emerging elements of various descriptions. It 
may be observed that the opening remark speaks of a definition “valid for the 
period of traditional international law”. It is because I am deeply convinced that 
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 1 “International Law as a law between Sovereign and equal States based on the 
common consent of these States is a product of modern Christian civilisation, and may be 
said to be hardly four hundred years old.” Oppenheim, L.: International Law: A Treatise. 
Vol. 1, London–New York–Bombay, 1905. 44. 
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humanitarian intervention cannot be accurately described by one single de-
finition with respect to both the traditional and the current era of public inter-
national law.2 This is attributable to a number of factors. For instance the legal 
environment surrounding intervention on grounds of humanity was substan-
tially altered following the adoption of the UN Charter, as a consequence of 
which it–being a forceful measure–almost entirely left the domain of the 
principle of non-intervention and entered that of the prohibition of the use 
of force. Furthermore, the legal terminology meant to describe it has also 
changed, not to mention a number of modifications in the very content of the 
phrase, such as the widening of the group of potential subjects of intervention 
with certain international organizations, or the broadening of its possible 
grounds with the fundamental guarantees of international humanitarian law 
applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character. 
 Having considered the relevant literature of those days,3 the definition of 
intervention on grounds of humanity applicable to the pre-Charter period can 
be formulated as follows: humanitarian intervention was a dictatorial inter-
ference involving the use of force, but not qualifying as war, carried out as a 
last resort and free from selfish motives by one or more civilized states against 
another state in absence of the consent or request thereof, with a view to coerce 
it to cease the grave and widespread violations of fundamental freedoms and 
human rights of its own nationals. 
 A few supplementary remarks are nevertheless necessary to shed more light 
on the special features of humanitarian intervention, and to make the content of 
the definition perfectly clear. First of all, the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes was generally considered a last resort, which could be utilized only 
after all other, non-violent measures had failed. Other requirements or obli-
gations, however, did not really emerge vis-à-vis the intervening states. Thus 
the norms of the law of war restricting the right of belligerents to freely choose 
the means and methods of warfare reached a level of development on which 
one can perceive them as a substantial constraining factor only after 1899, near 
the end of the period under consideration. Let us not forget either that these 
norms governed situations of de iure war,4 but–as it will be thoroughly dis-
  
 2 The creation of a definition of humanitarian intervention embracing both major 
periods of international law is, of course, not impossible. I am merely saying that it would 
inevitably be either inaccurate, or too vague. 
 3 It would be excessive to enumerate here all of the sources consulted. Nevertheless, 
they can be found in the footnotes below. See especially infra, notes 12–13, 16. 
 4 Cf. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 
29 July 1899, Article 2; Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the 
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cussed later on–intervention was a category distinct from war. In relation to the 
means and methods of forceful measures short of war only the inherently limited 
nature of these actions, some arguably surviving remnants of the natural 
doctrine of just war as well as rationality and expediency could pose actual 
boundaries. 
 Notwithstanding the fact that some of the authors of the period adopted this 
method,5 I do not see any reason for the independent treatment of intervention 
on grounds of humanity and intervention on grounds of religion, provided that 
the latter was not carried out as a manifestation of religious intolerance, but to 
suppress religious persecution. Even though these two kinds of intervention 
should not be discussed separately, they were not totally identical either, that is 
to say, the scope of humanitarian intervention must not be restricted to the 
enforcement of the freedom of religion. The relationship between them was a 
relation of a part (intervention on grounds of religion) to a whole (humani-
tarian intervention), as the blatant denial of the freedom of religion regularly 
brought along a violation of other human rights, as well. 
 It may be observed that the definition above speaks of “civilized states” as 
the sole subjects of international law having been able to carry out a humani-
tarian intervention in the past. Despite that the distinction of civilized and 
uncivilized nations appeared fairly seldom in the relevant works,6 I consider 
the inclusion of this condition well founded for three reasons. Firstly, the 
“civilized-semi-civilized-uncivilized” partition was an axiomatic principle of 
traditional international law that academics may not necessarily have wished to 
reaffirm repeatedly. Secondly, the genuine subjects of international law were 
civilized states, so its rules could not have granted a right of intervention to 
semi-civilized or uncivilized nations. Thirdly, the attribute “civilized” is used 
exclusively in connection with states carrying out the intervention; a contrario 
a target state could have belonged to any of these three categories. It would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
Principles of the Geneva Convention of August 22, 1864, The Hague, 29 July 1899, Article 
11; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies 
in the Field, Geneva, 6 July 1906, Article 24; Convention Relative to the Opening of 
Hostilities, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Article 3. 
 5 See e.g. Bonfils, H.: Manuel de droit international public. 7th edition (P. Fauchille 
ed.), Paris, 1914. 203; Phillimore, R. J.: Commentaries upon International Law. 3rd edition, 
Vol. 1, London, 1879. 618. 
 6 See e.g. Martens, F. F.: Völkerrecht. Das internationale Recht der civilisierten 
Nationen. (C. Bergbohm ed.) Vol. 1, Berlin, 1883. 301–302; Werner, R.: A természetjog, 
vagy bölcseleti jogtudomány kézikönyve. Összehasonlító tekintettel a tételes jog intézkedé-
seire [Manual of Natural Law, or of Philosophical Legal Science. With Comparative 
Regard to Measures of Positive Law]. Vol. 2, Pest, 1869. 338. 
224 GÁBOR SULYOK 
  
a mistake to restrict the circle of target states to the group of semi-civilized and 
uncivilized countries, since the theoretical possibility of a humanitarian 
intervention against a civilized state was equally present although such action 
was almost certainly not carried out in practice. (Civilized states usually resorted 
to “humanitarian representations” in their relations with one another.) In 
addition, international lawyers of the period would not have devoted so much 
attention to the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention if it had 
been applicable only against semi-civilized or uncivilized nations, which could 
not fully enjoy the protection afforded by international law, particularly the 
principle of non-intervention. 
 It may be noticed that the definition contains nothing regarding issue of 
legality, because I believe that the classification of an intervention as humani-
tarian did not automatically bring about its lawfulness. In other words, humani-
tarian intervention was not a legal title of absolute value. The following sections 
are meant to elaborate on this particular issue. 
 
 
II. 
 
Customary law was undoubtedly the dominant source of public international 
law in the pre-Charter period. It is therefore obvious that the legality of past 
humanitarian interventions has to be examined in the framework of contem-
poraneous customary law in the first place. As commonly known, this source 
of international law is composed of two segments. The objective element of 
customary law is state practice (consuetudo/desuetudo, diuturnitas, usus),7 in 
addition to the subjective element, the so-called opinio iuris sive necessitatis.8 
  
 7 “State practice means any act or statement by a State from which views about 
customary law can be inferred; it includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto 
[…], national laws, national judgments and omissions.” Akehurst, M.: Custom as a Source 
of International Law. British Yearbook of International Law 47 (1974–1975), 53. Several 
authors, however, challenge the practical importance of in abstracto declarations. Cf. e.g. 
Thirlway, H. W. A.: International Customary Law and Codification. Leiden, 1972, 58. 
 8 For an examination of traditional international law, one obviously needs the 
“traditional” concept of opinio iuris: “Traditionally, opinio juris was discussed not from 
the point of view of law-creation but from that of law-application. Its primary function was 
to draw a distinction between legally binding customary norms, on the one hand, and 
other social norms, particularly moral norms and comity, on the other, in the process of 
ascertaining and applying international law. The traditional interpretation of opinio juris 
was also developed under the strong influence of various natural law theories according to 
which practice does not create legal obligations but simply reflects the already existing 
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One can speak of an existing norm of customary law exclusively in case of a 
parallel coexistence of these two segments, both with respect to the past and 
the present. Consequently, a proof of relevant practice is not at all equivalent to 
an evidence of customary law. If a right of humanitarian intervention had ever 
been a part of customary law, a sufficient state practice as well as the adjacent 
opinio iuris can and should be revealed. 
 The state practice appears to be provable, although it may well be subject 
to debate how many of the most frequently cited instances qualified as a 
genuine humanitarian intervention. (This is to a great extent due to the 
absence of consensus on the notion of humanitarian intervention.) Diplomatic 
representations in connection with the actual recourses to force further render 
the existence of relevant state practice possible, since the usus is established 
not only by physical actions but also by other conducts. It cannot be denied, 
however, that the 19th century state practice comprised of a handful of instances, 
and even less can be said about the first half of the 20th century. Instances of 
humanitarian intervention during the 19th century were carried out almost 
exclusively by the European Great Powers against the Ottoman Empire–the 
sole, yet rather questionable, exception being the action of the United States in 
Cuba in 1898.9 There is therefore a great deal of subjectivity in determining 
if this seemingly sporadic practice suffices as usus. On the other hand, the 
international community of states was extremely small at that time, thus one 
may find that, in fact, a relatively large number of its members participated in 
these interventions. As for concerns relating to the alleged infrequency of 
                                                                                                                                                 
ones. In the framework of this approach, opinio juris was defined as a feeling or belief that 
practice corresponds to an already existing legal obligation.” Danilenko, G.: Law-Making 
in the International Community. Dordrecht–Boston–London, 1993. 99. The International 
Court of Justice perceived opinio iuris in a similar manner in the Case concerning the North 
Sea Continental Shelf. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Denmark) (Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgement of 20 February 1969, 
I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 77, at 44. 
 9 The most frequently mentioned occurrences are the following: Greece (1827–1830), 
Syria (1860–1861), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria (1877–1878), Cuba (1898), 
Macedonia (1912–1913). The Cuban action was perhaps the only humanitarian inter-
vention, if seen as such, which was carried out by one civilized state against another. 
Admittedly, Article VII of the 1856 Peace Treaty of Paris permitted the Sublime Porte “to 
participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe”, but the 
practical significance of this solemn declaration proved even at that time rather negligible. 
Cf. e.g. Phillimore: op. cit., 635. This list, however, can be considerably extended, if one 
includes non-violent interventions, as well. See e.g. Grewe, W. G.: Epocher der Völker-
rechtsgeschichte. 2nd edition, Baden-Baden, 1988. 577–579; Stowell, E. C.: Intervention 
in International Law. Washington D.C., 1921. 63–277. 
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actions, they might be considerably resolved with referral to an opinion, 
according to which “[t]he number of States taking part in a practice is much 
more important than the number of separate acts of which the practice is 
composed, or the time over which it is spread”.10 For that reason, it is not 
impossible that an adequate state practice of humanitarian intervention existed–
the real question is whether or not international law permitted it. 
 The question of opinio iuris–although not resulting in a direct and coherent 
debate–set scholars of international law against one another even in the period 
under deliberation. Certain statements of politicians, which might serve as an 
evidence of legal belief, could provide a guideline for the determination whether 
a state perceived its action as an exercise of a right, but it would be unwise to 
draw conclusions of universal validity solely from such pronouncements. I am 
convinced that the analysis of the legal literature of that time “as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law” is perhaps the most expedient 
method. The technique to be applied for this purpose is relatively simple, and 
is basically the same as the one adopted earlier for the construction of the 
definition of humanitarian intervention. In case the overwhelming majority of 
eminent authorities of “civilized nations”, who were most probably in know-
ledge of state practice and opinio iuris, supported a right of intervention on 
grounds of humanity, then we have reason to believe that this category was 
indeed in line with the norms of customary international law, and vice versa. 
The summary of opinions derived from the most influential works on inter-
national law leads, however, to a somewhat astonishing result: teachings of 
international lawyers do not give a definitive answer to the question. It can be 
observed that nearly as many outstanding figures considered humanitarian inter-
vention lawful as those who expressly rejected it; not to mention the significant 
group of authors, who–due to the cautiousness or vagueness of their opinions–
stood somewhere between the two extremes.11 
 Within the framework of a brief enumeration, one may mention, inter alia, 
the following international lawyers–including, for the sake of interest, a few 
representatives of Hungarian legal doctrine–among those who considered 
humanitarian intervention lawful: Johann C. Bluntschli, Edwin M. Borchard, 
László Buza, Carlos Calvo, Charles G. Fenwick, István Kiss, Fjodor F. Martens, 
  
 10 Akehurst: op. cit., 14. 
 11 For an opposing statement, according to which “a majority of writers accepted the 
idea of a lawful humanitarian intervention”, and only a “substantial minority of scholars” 
rejected this view (although its legality under customary law is still debatable), see 
Beyerlin, U.: Humanitarian Intervention, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Vol. 3, New York–London, 1982. 212. 
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Antoine Rougier, Ellery C. Stowell, Pál Tassy, László Vincze Weninger, Rudolf 
Werner, John Westlake, Henry Wheaton and Theodore Woolsey.12 Naturally, 
all of them defined the notion of humanitarian intervention in a more or less 
divergent manner. Nevertheless, I believe that it does not deprive their 
consensus of its value, because in spite of the differences, the basic conception 
remained the same. The lawfulness of humanitarian intervention was clearly 
ruled out, for instance, by István Apáthy, Henry Bonfils, János Csarada, 
August W. Heffter, Albert Irk, Franz von Liszt, Karl Melczer, Paul L. E. 
Pradier-Fodéré, Leo Strisower, Karl Strupp and Gyula Thegze.13 Manouchehr 
Ganji also added the famous philosopher, Immanuel Kant to this group,14 but 
  
 12 See Bluntschli, J. C.: Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Recht-
buch dargestellt. Nördlingen, 1868. 268; Borchard, E. M.: The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad. New York, 1922. 14; Buza, L.: Szabadság és beavatkozás a nemzetközi 
jogban [Freedom and Intervention in International Law] Szeged, 1936. 5; Calvo, C.: Le droit 
international théorique et pratique, précédé d’un exposé historique des progrès de la science 
du droit des gens. 4th edition, Vol. 1, Paris–Berlin, 1887. 302–303; Fenwick, C. G.: 
International Law. London, 1924. 154; Kiss, I.: Európai nemzetközi jog [European Inter-
national Law]. Eger, 1876. 94–95; Martens: op. cit., 301–302; Rougier, A.: La théorie de 
l’intervention humanité. Revue Générale de Droit International Public 17 (1910), 472; 
Stowell: Intervention in International Law, 53; Tassy, P.: Az európai nemzetközi jog vezér-
fonala [The Guiding Principle of European International Law]. Kecskemét, 1887. 46; 
Weninger, L. V.: Az új nemzetközi jog [The New International Law]. Budapest, 1927. 101 
(although he might be inserted in the third group, as well); Werner: op. cit. 338; Westlake, J.: 
International Law. 2nd edition, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1910. 319–320; Wheaton, H.: Elements 
of International Law. 8th edition (R. H. Dana ed.), London–Boston, 1866. 113; Woolsey, 
T. D.: Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and 
in Historical Studies. Boston–Cambridge, 1860. 91. 
 13 See Apáthy, I.: Tételes európai nemzetközi jog [Positive European International Law]. 
Budapest, 1878. 112; Bonfils: op. cit., 203, 205; Csarada, J.: A tételes nemzetközi jog 
rendszere [The System of Positive International Law]. Budapest, 1901. 179; Heffter, A. W.: 
Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart. 3rd edition, Berlin, 1855. 92; Irk, A.: 
Bevezetés az új nemzetközi jogba [Introduction to New International Law]. 2nd edition, 
1929. 111; Liszt, F., von: Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt. 7th edition, Berlin, 1911. 
66; Melczer, K.: Grundzüge des Völkerrechts. Wien–Leipzig, 1922. 35–36; Pradier-Fodéré, 
P. L. E.: Traité de droit international public européen & américain. Vol. 1, Paris, 1887. 
632; Strisower, L.: Der Krieg und die Völkerrechtsordnung. Wien, 1919. 121–122, 125.; 
Strupp, K.: Éléments du droit international public universel, européen et américain. 2nd 
edition, Paris, 1930. 124; Thegze, Gy.: Nemzetközi jog [International Law] Debrecen, 
1930. 205. 
 14 Cf. Ganji, M.: International Protection of Human Rights. Genève–Paris, 1962. 41. 
Cf. furthermore Kant, I.: Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Königsberg, 
1796. 11–12. 
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to tell the truth, John Stuart Mill can likewise be included, although some of 
his thoughts approximated the interventionist approach.15 For various reasons, 
views expressed by the following authors can be inserted in neither of the 
categories above: William E. Hall, Thomas J. Lawrence, Lassa Oppenheim, 
Pitman B. Potter, Robert J. Phillimore and Percy H. Winfield.16 
 For the previously applied method of revealing the 19th century opinio 
iuris regarding humanitarian intervention has led to a controversial outcome, 
one might make an alternative attempt to derive legality from the natural 
doctrine of bellum iustum, because the phrase “iustum” had referred not only to 
a war having been just, but also to the fact that it had been in conformity with 
the “necessary law of nature”. The phenomenon qualified today as a grave and 
widespread violation of human rights was once, under the doctrine of just war, 
one of the just causes of war. It appeared in works of such classics as Francisco 
de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius.17 We may 
reasonably believe that–parallel to the development of the “voluntary law of 
nations”–this iusta causa seceded from the gradually eclipsing natural 
doctrine of bellum iustum and ultimately gained independence within positive 
international law as intervention on grounds of humanity. Based upon this 
assumption, it may be concluded that the lawfulness of humanitarian inter-
vention under customary international law was a result of the outlasting of one 
of the segments of just war. This train of thoughts seems prima facie plausible. 
However, it should not be overlooked that approximately at the turn of the 
18th and 19th centuries, simultaneously to a presumed recognition of such 
  
 15 Cf. Mill, J. S.: A Few Words on Non-Intervention, in Mill, J. S. (ed.): Dissertations 
and Discussions, Political, Phylosophical, and Historical. Vol. 3, London, 1867. 172–173, 
176. 
 16 See Hall, W. E.: A Treatise on International Law. 8th edition (A. P. Higgins ed.), 
Oxford, 1924. 342; Lawrence, T. J.: The Principles of International Law. 3rd edition, 
Boston, 1905. 120-121; Oppenheim: op. cit., 186-187; Potter, P. B.: L’intervention en droit 
international moderne. Recueil des Cours 32 (1930-II), 652–653; Phillimore: op. cit., 560, 
623, 638; Winfield, P. H.: The Grounds of Intervention in International Law, British 
Yearbook of International Law (1924), 161–162. 
 17 See Gentili, A.: De iure belli libri tres [Three Books on the Law of War] (J. C. Rolfe 
transl.), Vol. 2, Oxford–London, 1933. I. XXIII. 186, at 115, I. XXV. 198, at 122; Grotius, 
H.: A háború és a béke jogáról [On the Law of War and Peace]. Vol. 2, Budapest, 1999. II. 
XXV. VIII. 4, at 159; Suárez, F.: De triplici virtute theologica, fide, spe et charitate [A 
Work on the Three Theological Virtues: Faith, Hope and Charity], in Williams, G. L.–
Brown, A.–Waldron, J. (prep.)–Davis, H. (rev.): Selections from Three Works of Francisco 
Suárez. Vol. 2, Oxford–London, 1944. XIII. IV. 3, at 817; Vitoria, F., de: De Indis recenter 
inventis [On the Indians Lately Discovered] (J. P. Bate transl.), in Scott, J. B.: The Spanish 
Origin of International Law. Vol. 1, Oxford–London, 1934. III. 13, 15, at xliii–xliv. 
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actions by positive law, the principle of non-intervention emerged as a corner-
stone of international law. In light of this, the survival of legality of a just war 
for altruistic purposes in the form of a right of humanitarian intervention appears 
extremely dubious.18 
 The principle of non-intervention could not affect the outlasting lawfulness 
of humanitarian intervention only if the latter possessed the quality of a right 
of intervention, in other words, if it was an exception to the major rule of 
prohibiting nature. The list of these rights of intervention can be drawn up on 
the basis of the legal literature of the period, whereas state practice offers only 
but a few certain and helpful pieces of information in this regard. Acceptable 
rights of intervention, however, differed from author to author, not to mention 
those scholars who automatically denied the very existence thereof.19 To sum 
up, in order to derive a customary right of humanitarian intervention from the 
survival of the above-mentioned element of bellum iustum, it has to be proven 
primarily that the prohibition of intervention–one of the most fundamental norms 
of the post-Westphalia world order–did not affect this continuity. To facilitate 
that, the fairly controversial coexisting legal literature has to be consulted, 
with the intention of illustrating whether or not the indispensable opinio iuris 
was present concerning the actual existence of this particular right of inter-
vention. In other words, one inevitably has to face our starting, yet definitely 
unanswerable question at the end of an analysis focusing on the survival of 
bellum iustum, as well. 
 It is inappropriate to restrict the scope of examination to customary law, 
and to the communis opinio doctorum. A limited number of international 
treaties providing for a state party to respect specific human rights–mainly the 
freedom of religion–of its own subjects might also be of interest. Merely upon 
the basis of state practice it may appear that in case of a violation of these 
human rights by the obliged state, the other parties enjoyed some sort of a right 
of intervention, sometimes even a right of armed intervention, the principal 
function of which was to enforce the fulfilment of obligations undertaken in 
the treaty.20 This right of armed intervention seemingly manifested itself as a 
  
 18 The restrained tone of Emeric de Vattel, for example, reflects this uncertainty. Cf. 
Vattel, E., de: Le droit de gens ou principes de la loi naturelle. Appliqués à la conduite et 
aux affaires des nations et souverains [Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, 
applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns]. (C. G. Fenwick transl.), 
Vol. 3, Washington D. C., 1916. Introd. 22–23, at 8, II. IV. 54–55, at 131. 
 19 Cf. Martens: op. cit., 299. 
 20 The most important treaty stipulations with regard to the relevant 19th century state 
practice were perhaps the following: Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Turkey and 
Russia, Kutchuk-Kainardji, 21 July 1774, Articles VII–VIII, XIV, XVI–XVIII; Peace 
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sanction or a treaty guarantee, and was a particularly “popular” and often 
invoked ground in the practical implementation of instruments envisaging a 
free exercise of religion for Christian minorities living under the rule of the 
Sublime Porte. Unquestionable is the fact that states parties to such agreements 
indeed intervened militarily on some occasions, but the humanitarian nature 
and legality of their action did not follow automatically. Especially not in light 
of the fact that the treaties incorporating human rights provisions did not contain 
explicit clauses for a right of armed intervention, should a breach of the 
instrument occur. Notwithstanding, I consider the problem worthy of thorough 
deliberation, chiefly in view of Manouchehr Ganji’s well-known theory on the 
common features of past humanitarian interventions, which directly linked 
these actions to treaty stipulations containing the obligation to respect the 
freedom of religion.21 
 Traditional international law recognized several rights of intervention in 
connection with international treaties. The first group of these rights–formulated 
in abstracto or for a specific event–originated directly from the text of a treaty, 
thus any action in invocation thereof was to be seen as a lawful exception to 
the principle of non-intervention, due to the consensual nature of the agreement.22 
Nevertheless, the majority of authors discussed these expressis verbis stipulated 
rights of intervention either in the context of the restoration of a sovereign, a 
government or of constitutional order, or–in more general terms–emphasized 
only the requirement of consent by the target state. With such special 
content, this set of rights is obviously inadequate for the demonstration of the 
lawfulness of intervention on grounds of humanity. This is, however, not the 
sole argument to hamper the successful continuation of the examination. Any 
right of intervention provided for in a treaty carries with itself an inherent 
contradiction. The essence of intervention–including humanitarian intervention–
is coercion, whereas the most important feature of a treaty, at least in this regard, 
is consensus: an intervention based upon a treaty provision is, therefore, a 
paradox. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Treaty between Great Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, Sardinia, and Russia, Paris, 30 
March 1856, Articles VIII–IX; Treaty between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey, Berlin, 13 July 1878, Articles XXIII, LXI–LXII. 
 21 See Ganji: op. cit., 37. 
 22 See e.g. Apáthy: op. cit., 109; Buza: Szabadság és beavatkozás a nemzetközi jogban. 
op. cit. 2; Bluntschli: op. cit., 267; Csarada: op. cit., 178; Lawrence: op. cit., 118; Liszt: op. 
cit., 66; Oppenheim: op. cit., 184; Strisower: op. cit., 114; Strupp, K.: Theorie und Praxis 
des Völkerrechts. Ein Grundriß zum akademischen Gebrauch und zum Selbststudium. Berlin, 
1925. 29. For a critical evaluation, see Stowell: Intervention in International Law, 438–
446. 
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 A further right of intervention relating to international treaties served as a 
sanction beyond the texts of treaties, but likewise served the fulfilment of 
violated treaty obligations. As Oppenheim stated: 
 
“Thus, thirdly, if a State which is restricted by an international treaty in its 
internal independence or its territorial or personal supremacy, does not 
comply with the restrictions concerned, the other party or parties have a 
right to intervene.”23 
 
 Disturbing as it may sound, most of the contemporaneous experts did not 
even mention this right of intervention: perhaps they deemed its existence self-
evident, or examined it under a different heading, for instance that of reprisal.  
The quotation above does not offer a definitive answer as to the relationship 
between the right at issue and the category of reprisal. It seems that Oppenheim 
simply treated a reprisal applicable in the wake of a breach of a treaty as a 
separate right of intervention. If this assumption is correct, it may be concluded 
that an intervention sanctioning a violation of a treaty obligation to respect 
human rights was almost certainly lawful; in addition, it could be classified 
simultaneously as humanitarian intervention. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that the international legality of the resort to force in this particular case was 
a result of an accidental overlapping of the normally distinct categories of 
humanitarian intervention and armed reprisal, but not a clear evidence of the 
lawfulness of the former under customary law. 
 This statement begs the explanation why humanitarian intervention could 
not be equalized with armed reprisal and categorized as a permissible measure 
under traditional international law. Since a reprisal presupposes a violation of a 
norm of international law, one must first answer the question, whether or not 
such violation occurred, if a state trod the fundamental rights of its nationals 
under foot during the period concerned. In order to be able to answer this 
question, a brief preliminary examination of a standard legal relation in the field 
of human rights has to be carried out, which mainly focuses on the following 
problem: Towards whom did states undertake the obligation to respect human 
rights already in existence? Towards their nationals only (per se obligation), 
or–besides them–towards other states, as well (inter se obligation)?24 In the 
  
 23 Oppenheim: op. cit., 183. See also Phillimore: op. cit., 568. 
 24 According to András Bragyova, the undertaking of human rights obligations 
establishes a per se obligation, not an inter se one, because “the state obliges itself towards 
itself”. (Translation mine.) He further adds that the lack of a substantive international right 
or obligation does not rule out the existence of certain procedural rights or obligations on 
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latter case, a violation of human rights inevitably would have injured not 
only the individuals but also the other states; consequently each and every 
humanitarian intervention would have been an armed reprisal. This is, as the 
conditional voice suggests, a less tenable assertion. It seems more defendable 
that in absence of an express stipulation, other states did not receive any rights 
from the undertaking of an obligation to respect human rights. Therefore, a 
violation of these rights could not have injured subjects other than the 
individuals–in other words: an intervention on grounds of humanity in favour 
of them could not be characterized as a reprisal. There is only one exception 
imaginable to this major rule. If states concluded a treaty in which they 
established an inter se human rights obligation–that is to say, they undertook 
the observance of human rights towards one another, as well–, the atrocities 
injured both the individuals and the other parties. Should the treaties previously 
mentioned be seen as such instruments, any breach of them produced an 
unintentional overlapping of humanitarian intervention and armed reprisal. 
The correctness of this allegation is also supported by the fact that human 
rights were within the domestic jurisdiction of states during the pre-Charter 
era, and became of international concern solely by insertion into international 
agreements. 
 Given the extreme, sometimes even chaotic diversity of the pre-Charter 
science of international law, it is not surprising that there was a third position, 
as well. According to this view, the treaties referred to above directly provided 
for a right of intervention for other parties even in absence of specific stipula-
tions and independently from customary law, should a breach take place. As 
Percy H. Winfield wrote: 
 
“The provision for a future intervention is either express or, more commonly, 
implied, and in either case must take effect as the secondary or sanctioning 
right necessary to secure the maintenance of the rights and duties conferred 
or imposed by the treaty.”25 
                                                                                                                                                 
the side of other states, in case of a violation of these rights. See Bragyova, A.: Ala-
pozhatók-e az emberi jogok a nemzetközi jogra? [Can Human Rights Be Based upon 
International Law?], Állam- és Jogtudomány 32 (1990), 100–101, 103–104. 
 25 Winfield: op. cit., 158. Winfield mentioned, among others, Articles LXI and LXII of 
the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, although none of these stipulations provided for a right of armed 
intervention. On the contrary, Article LXI only contained the verb “superintend”, whereas 
Article LXII merely recognized a right of Powers to “official protection” by diplomatic or 
consular agents. Evidently, none of these guarantees can be identified as a right of armed 
intervention. It is true that diplomatic protection often took a violent form during the 19th 
century, but its beneficiaries were the nationals of the intervening state. The group of 
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 Furthermore, Winfield believed that if an intervention was “not otherwise 
righteous”, then an agreement to carry it out could neither be considered to be 
in conformity with international law, similarly to the provisions of municipal 
law.26 (The phrase “not otherwise righteous” was presumably a referral to 
customary law.) Disregarding the previous conclusions, one therefore has to 
examine a further hypothesis in which a treaty could incorporate a right of 
intervention even in an implicit manner. 
 I feel it necessary to state at the very beginning that–at least in my opinion–
even the starting point suffers from serious legal and logical defects; beyond 
the fact that the concept of a right of intervention originating from a treaty, per 
se, appears to be a paradox. The recognition of “implicit” or “inherent” treaty 
provisions in general (irrespective of the subsequent theory of inherent powers 
in the law of international organizations) is based upon the blurring of boundaries 
between customary and treaty law. Had the parties really wished to secure this 
“sanctioning right”, they most likely would have done it explicitly. If states did 
not include such possibility, it was because they either did not want to provide 
for it, or it was superfluous to do so, as it had been present and applicable 
under customary law anyway. It is a scarcely acceptable submission that, even 
though a treaty stipulates nothing in this regard, a right of intervention exists, 
moreover, it stems from the document itself. 
 Should one nevertheless adopt the idea of a right of humanitarian inter-
vention emerging somehow from a treaty, there are two ways to derive its 
lawfulness under customary law. On the one hand, it might be possible that the 
provisions of relevant treaties merely reflected coexisting customary law. On 
the other hand, it cannot be ruled out either that it was the norm of customary 
law, which came into existence as a result of treaty provisions. The latter 
presumption is as reasonable as the first one, given that the majority of inter-
national agreements being discussed was concluded between the Great Powers 
of that time–influential states, whose actual interventions might have had an 
immense impact on the evolution of customary law. The thought of a treaty 
provision to become a norm of customary law is widely accepted even 
nowadays (although it cannot be presumed in general): 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals entitled to protection by diplomatic or consular agents under Article LXII of the 
Treaty of Berlin, however, encompassed all natural persons–irrespective of their nationality–
on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. 
 26 See ibid., 159. For a different view, see Strisower: op. cit., 114–115. 
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“Just as a series of bilateral treaties concluded over a period of time by 
various States, all consistently adopting the same solution to the same 
problem of the relationships between them, may give rise to a new rule of 
customary international law, so the general ratification of a treaty laying 
down general rules to govern the future relationships of States in a given 
field has a similar effect.”27 
 
 Humphrey Waldock, however, added an important remark, according to 
which the norms created this way “acquired their authority as general rules of 
international law… from the State practice, not from the treaties themselves”.28 
This pattern of establishment of customary law is not always unambiguous and 
possible. The Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, referred 
to it in the case of the S. S. Lotus: “Finally, as regards conventions expressly 
reserving jurisdiction exclusively to the State whose flag is flown, it is not 
absolutely certain that this stipulation is to be regarded as expressing a general 
principle of law…”29 Both of the theoretical ways mentioned above seem 
rational, but–and my concluding observation in this connection is as follows–
they necessarily turn out to be of no use, as none of them by-passes the problem 
of customary law, particularly the difficulties concerning the demonstration of 
opinio iuris. 
 For the sake of completeness, it should also be examined whether or not 
humanitarian intervention had ever belonged to the “general principles of inter-
national law recognized by civilized nations”,30 and was thus a lawful measure. 
Firstly, it has to be noted that several problems emerge in relation to this task 
owing to the actual character of general principles of law not being unequivocal. 
Do they originate from the common principles of domestic law, or are they 
special principles of international nature meant to fill the gaps in international 
law? It can also be a subject of debate whether these principles of law represent 
surviving segments of natural law, or their content has to be sought for and 
  
 27 Thirlway: op. cit., 59. See also Brownlie, I.: Principles of Public International Law. 
6th edition, Oxford, 2003. 12–13; International Law Association: Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference. London, 2000. 753–765. 
 28 Waldock, C. H. M.: General Course on Public International Law. Recueil des Cours 
106 (1962-II), 41. 
 29 The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), Judgement No. 9, 7 September 1927, in Hudson, 
M. O. (ed.): World Court Reports. A Collection of the Judgements, Orders and Opinions of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Reprint of the edition of 1935, Vol. 2, 
Buffalo, 2000. 41–42. 
 30 For a detailed analysis of this topic, see Herczegh, G.: General Principles of Law 
and the International Legal Order. Budapest, 1969. 
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interpreted only in the framework of positive law. Not to mention the question 
pertaining to the identity of those actors empowered or bound by the general 
principles of law: is it the states generally, or the courts that apply them? (It 
needs to be underlined that in the period under deliberation the recognition of a 
general principle of law by “civilized nations” was an essential condition, not 
an anachronistic phrase, as it is held to be nowadays.) 
 Supposing that the general principles of international law directly empower 
or bind states–and they did so in the past, as well–it has to be examined first, if 
there was a gap in law concerning the problem of humanitarian intervention, 
which could have left room for an invocation of these principles.31 In my view, 
the result can only be a negative one: the fact that an indisputable conclusion 
can be drawn neither from treaty law, nor from customary law is not equal to 
the existence of a gap in law. 
 It is fair to say that, according to the dominant position in the science of 
international law, a referral to the general principles of law is in fact an 
application of certain domestic legal principles by way of analogy on the 
international level. Bearing this circumstance in mind, and recalling that 19th 
century European and American legal literature in essence adopted a positivist 
approach, one can readily derive that the general principles of international law 
could hardly ever serve as a basis for the lawfulness of interventions on grounds 
of humanity. Naturally, an adequately backed up judgement could be made 
only after a thorough study of domestic laws of one-time civilized nations; never-
theless I strongly doubt that there have ever been common, well-established 
legal principles in the legal systems of the countries concerned which could 
provide a proper ground for even a distant analogy. Since this task goes far 
beyond the scope of the present study, we should confine ourselves to the 
application of indirect arguments. 
 The best imaginable theoretical combination for the lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention would be the one according to which the general principles 
of law are and were specific international principles with a content taken from 
natural law. Thus, the principles of natural law, including the requirement of 
  
 31 The following opinion is worth recalling at this point: “Es gibt ferner auch negatives 
Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Negatives Völkergewohnheitsrecht entsteht, wenn die überein-
stimmende, von Rechtsüberzeugung getragene Staatenpraxis davon ausgeht, daß ein 
bestimmter abstrakter Rechtssatz des Völkergewohnheitsrechts nicht besteht. Ein solcher 
Rechtssatz des Völkergewohnheitsrechts hat insbesondere die Funktion, den Rückgriff auf 
die Analogie, auf allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze und sonstige subsidiäre Rechtsquellen des 
Völkerrechts auszuschließen.” Bleckmann, A.: Zur Feststellung und Auslegung von 
Völkergewohnheitsrecht. Zeitschrift für ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 
37 (1977), 511. 
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justice, invoked by authors in the 17th and 18th centuries could have been 
applied to legalize humanitarian intervention. The positivist literature, however, 
did not support this assumption, and therefore it is futile to deal with it in 
detail. Such ideas have never been common in past and present legal literature, 
which also undermines the applicability of the general principles of law in this 
case. In the knowledge of heated debates regarding the lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention, any truly applicable general principle is most likely to have 
received much more attention by international lawyers. 
 Finally, it is advisable to take a look at the so-called ius ad bellum, that is 
to say, the “sacred” right to resort to war. Ius ad bellum was one of the most 
fundamental attributes of state sovereignty in the pre-Charter era, providing a 
right for states to engage in war for nearly any reason.32 Nonetheless, this is 
an oversimplified formulation of the true meaning of ius ad bellum. In reality, 
this right was subject to a number of limitations: for instance, it was to be 
exercised always as a last resort and required an appropriate casus belli–be that 
genuine or alleged. The catalogue of causes of war was extremely subjective, 
but it typically embraced the right of self-preservation, which on the other 
hand, usually included the category of intervention. Let us not forget that in 
this period the latter involved interventions carried out by force of arms, as 
well, which could barely be distinguished from a war at first sight. For this 
reason, one may easily come to the conclusion that humanitarian intervention, 
being an exercise of ius ad bellum, was lawful. This statement, however, hardly 
corresponds to the truth. As commonly known, war and intervention were 
actually two distinct and independently treated categories, even though they 
occasionally overlapped in literature.33 Intervention, including its armed mani-
festation, was dealt with under the rubric of the law of peace and was seen as a 
measure short of war, unlike war, which was discussed within a different 
framework and was defined as follows: 
 
  
 32 “War, as a means of law-making and law-enforcement, is therefore a necessary 
institution of current international law.” Buza, L.: Háború és nemzetközi jog [War and 
International Law]. 1943. 3. (Translation mine.) “The recognition of war as an inter-
national legal relation, however, does not at all depend on its legality or illegality. The 
group of persons that chooses it as means is determining the legality or illegality of war. 
(This is the most interesting feature of self-help.)” Weninger: op. cit., 298. (Italics omitted. 
Translation mine.) 
 33 The following remark by Lawrence clearly illustrates both the reason for this over-
lapping and the two categories being separate from one another: „Further, the cause which 
justifies intervention must be important enough to justify war.” Lawrence: op. cit., 118. 
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“Der Krieg als Erscheinung des internationalen Lebens, ist ein Zustand, der 
von Seite mehrerer einander gegenüberstehender Staaten darauf gerichtet ist, 
daß jede Partei die andere durch allgemeinen wechselseitigen Eingriff in 
ihre Güter behufs Durchsetzung eines gewissen Zweckes überwinde. […] 
Der Zweck des Krieges ist gewiß nicht in den Kriegsakten beschlossen. 
Aber der eigentümliche, rechtliche Gegensatz des Krieges gegenüber dem 
Friedenszustande, dem Zustande ohne Krieg, liegt in den Kriegsakten, in 
dem dem Kriegszustande entsprechenden Verhalten, darin, daß solche Akte 
vorgenommen werden, um den Zweck des Krieges zu erreichen.”34 
 
 War was therefore a peculiar “state”, or in other words, a special legal 
relation, in the framework of which each belligerent as well as the neutral states 
acquired certain rights and duties.35 War was neither an objective category, nor 
synonymous with the use of force. It could be established exclusively with a 
special intent (animus belligerendi), therefore the existence of a de iure war 
was dependent on a subjective decision of the belligerents.36 This will was as a 
rule reflected in the declaration of a state of war, and it could not be deduced 
simply from objective circumstances reminiscent of war, such as the appli-
cation of armed force by states against one another, the widescale loss of 
human life, or significant damage to property. Consequently, several forceful 
measures not requiring such intent–for example armed reprisal, embargo, 
pacific blockade, self-defence, and armed intervention–could not be properly 
classified as war.37 Furthermore, under ius ad bellum, the waging of war was 
entirely lawful (moreover, war occasionally appeared as an extra-legal pheno-
menon in some of the treatises), whereas intervention, irrespective of a few 
exceptions known as rights of intervention, was generally prohibited. Finally, 
war was comprehensive and unlimited with regard to both its goals and its 
means, whereas intervention was more of a limited nature in all respects. As a 
result, the lawfulness of intervention on grounds of humanity cannot be drawn 
from the ius ad bellum. 
 
 
  
 34 Strisower: op. cit., 4–5. 
 35 Cf. Liszt: op. cit., 282. 
 36 Cf. Meng, W.: War, in Bernhardt, R. (ed.): Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. Vol. 4, New York–London, 1982. 284. 
 37 Cf. Westlake, J.: International Law. Vol. 2, Cambridge, 1907. 2. See also Farer, T. J.: 
Law and War, in Black, C. E.–Falk, R. A. (eds.): The Future of International Legal Order. 
Vol. 3, Princeton, 1971. 15, 23–24; Strisower: op. cit., 6–7. 
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III. 
 
The legality of past humanitarian interventions has to be examined in the 
context of the principle of non-intervention rather than under the heading of 
war. This statement brings us to yet another field worthy of examination: the 
lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in the light of international treaties 
concluded during the first half of the 20th century adversely affecting the 
previous legality of war, namely the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
Pact of Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 
 The overwhelming majority of articles in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations contain the word “war”. There is no particular reason to believe that 
the content of this terminus technicus fundamentally changed during the years 
of World War I in a way that it came to encompass hostile measures short of 
war, including armed intervention. Arguing a maiori ad minus, one might 
claim that the gradual outlawing of war had an impact on the lesser category of 
intervention, which thus became totally illegal. However, the relationship 
between war and intervention was not a relation of a whole to a part, since they 
were, as it has already been noted, separate categories. 
 The principle of efficiency may also seem to strengthen the idea of a 
comprehensive ban on the use of force: it might be argued that the inter-
pretation of “war” in the Covenant in accordance with its strict legal sense would 
have hampered the most important aim of the League, namely “to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security”.38 
The rightness of this opinion is being contested by two circumstances. Firstly, 
“war” has always been a technical term that must be interpreted and applied in 
observance of this nature, regardless to the international instrument in which it 
appears. Secondly, as Hersch Lauterpacht mentioned, the early draft of the 
Covenant had originally contained the word “force”, but it was subsequently 
replaced by “war” in the final version of the text.39 This change, unless it was 
motivated by stylistic considerations, presumably veils the effort of states to 
preserve a substantial segment of their freedom of action by resorting to an 
expression bearing a much more restricted meaning. 
  
 38 Covenant of the League of Nations, preamble. For the text of Covenant, see Treaty 
of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, Versailles, 28 June 
1919, Part I, in Grenville, J. A. S.–Wasserstein, B. (eds.): The Major International Treaties 
of the Twentieth Century. A History and Guide with Texts. Vol. 1, London–New York, 
2001. 100–105. 
 39 See Lauterpacht, H.: “Resort to War” and the Interpretation of the Covenant 
During the Manchurian Dispute. American Journal of International Law 28 (1934), 49. 
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 The provisions of the Covenant concerning war apparently had divergent 
interpretations even in those days: many were convinced that the effects of 
the partial renunciation of war comprised all forms of the use of force. 
Interestingly enough, some organs of the League also adopted this position,40 
although the states themselves were clearly hesitant to construe “war” in a 
broad sense.41 Lauterpacht maintained that this phrase could be interpreted in 
three ways: broadly, to include “all measures of armed force”; narrowly, as a 
description of a state of war; and in line with a “specific meaning”, positioned 
somewhere between the two extremes. He further stated that: 
 
“Resort to war” may be deduced constructively from the recourse to armed 
force, but it is not synonymous with the use of armed force. […] It merely 
means that the Covenant does not indiscriminately and automatically 
render illegal all acts of armed force. But it means also that it authorizes 
the finding and treatment as illegal of such acts of force as members of the 
League may wish to treat as such, having regard to the nature of the case, 
to general political considerations, and to their attitude toward the idea of 
collective enforcement of peace.”42 
 
 This renowned expert of international law seemingly did not think that the 
Covenant outlawed all forms of the use of force: due to its vague wording, the 
determination and sanctioning of war was basically dependent on the actual 
political will of states. Article 10 of the Covenant was the sole provision, 
which arguably reflected an intention to prohibit every forceful measure: 
 
“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of 
  
 40 For instance, the Assembly of the League adopted a resolution in its sixth session 
in 1925, which stated that all aggressive wars were and remained prohibited. Since this 
resolution was not a formal amendment to the Covenant, its significance was merely of 
moral and political nature. Cf. Wehberg, H.: Die Völkerbundsatzung. 3rd edition, Berlin, 
1929. 95. Furthermore, in August 1921, the International Blockade Committee of the 
Assembly interpreted the expression “resort to war” in the Covenant as “undertaking of 
armed action”. See Stone, J.: Aggression and World Order. A Critique of United Nations 
Theories of Aggression. London, 1958. 29. 
 41 On the related debate, see Lauterpacht: op. cit., 47–51. 
 42 Ibid., 58–59. 
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any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the 
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”43 
 
 Humanitarian intervention, prima facie, appears to fit in the notion of an 
“external aggression” against the “existing political independence” of a state, 
even though a violation of “territorial integrity” is incompatible with the humani-
tarian nature thereof. (Noteworthy is the fact that the expressions “territorial 
integrity” and “existing political independence” stood in a conjunctive relation 
(and), not in a disjunctive one (or) as in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter. 
It may allow an interpretation, according to which Article 10 was applicable 
only in case of an aggression against both the political independence and the 
territorial integrity of a member, which would obviously shove humanitarian 
intervention out of the scope of the provision.) A generally recognized and 
legally binding definition of aggression did not come into being in the period 
between the two World Wars. Drafts as well as bi- or multilateral treaties 
were nevertheless adopted containing elements of the notion of aggression, 
according to which all forms of armed intervention was to be seen as an act of 
aggression. Among these instruments a draft prepared by the Soviet Union in 
1933 was of outstanding importance, which, in spite of its subsequent failure, 
served as a basis for several bilateral agreements.44 This draft overtly renounced 
acts of aggression, including the use of force in cases of “alleged malad-
ministration”, “possible danger to life or property of foreign residents”, 
“revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movements, civil war, disorders or 
strikes”, and as “religious or anti-religious measures”.45 
 If the term “external aggression” bore a similar meaning in the context of 
the Covenant, then interventions on grounds of humanity were presumably 
unlawful, although Article 10 did not state it explicitly. However, this 
reasoning is extremely speculative, as the drafts and treaties referred to above 
were concluded well after the entry into force of the Covenant, and carried the 
  
 43 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10. (Emphasis added.) 
 44 In the period between 1926 and 1937, the Soviet Union concluded a series of 
treaties on non-aggression in order to prevent its isolation. For instance, the Soviet-
Finnish agreement provided as follows: “Any act of violence attacking the integrity and 
inviolability of the territory or the political independence of the other High Contracting 
Party shall be regarded as an act of aggression, even if it is committed without declaration 
of war and avoids warlike manifestations.” Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Soviet 
Union and Finland, Helsinki, 21 January 1932, Article I, paragraph 2. For an English 
translation of the document, see Grenville–Wasserstein: op. cit., 191–192. 
 45 See Stone: op. cit., 34–36. 
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marks of the ensuing development of international law.46 Furthermore, judging 
from its wording, Article 10 probably laid down only a general rule–in addition 
to the creation of an obligation of collective defence–, leaving the details to be 
elaborated on by other articles of the Covenant dealing with collective 
security. Finally, as Hans Wehberg pointed out, each member state had a right 
to determine “nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen”,47 whether or not an external 
aggression existed. 
 The Covenant did not offer a definitive solution to the legality of humani-
tarian intervention, even if one–groundlessly–perceives such actions as a 
segment of the category of war. Although it declared war or a threat of war “a 
matter of concern to the whole League”, the mechanism meant to avert war 
was reserved exclusively for inter-state disputes “likely to lead to a rupture”. If 
such controversy occurred, members of the organization were obliged to 
“submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by 
the Council”, with a possibility in the latter case of a referral of the dispute to 
the Assembly of the League.48 Without going into a detailed introduction of the 
procedure of dispute settlement, one may raise the embarrassing question: 
Could there be any dispute–in the traditional meaning of this technical term–in 
the course of events leading to a humanitarian intervention? The answer seems 
to be negative. The question of human rights as well as the treatment of 
nationals–with only but a handful of exceptions elevated to the international 
level by international treaties, such as the protection of minorities or the 
abolition of slavery–was to be found in the domain of exclusive domestic 
jurisdiction of states.49 Demands were naturally formulated by the intervening 
  
 46 There existed, however, treaties of non-aggression that significantly deferred from 
the Soviet draft. See e.g. Anti-War Treaty of Nonaggression and Conciliation, Rio de 
Janeiro, 10 October 1933, preamble, Articles I–II. The content of “war of aggression” 
was not detailed in the treaty, but–in the light of a contextual interpretation of Articles I 
and II–it was closely linked to, although not equalized with, the violent settlement of 
territorial questions. For an English translation of the text, see Anti-War, Nonaggression 
and Conciliation, Treaty between the United States of America and Other American 
Republics. U.S. Treaty Series, No. 906. 14–18. 
 47 Wehberg: op. cit., 75. 
 48 For the process of dispute settlement, see Covenant of the League of Nations, 
Articles 11–16. 
 49 In support of this view, suffice it to recall the Bernheim case, in which the organs 
of the League adopted the position of the German Reichsregierung concerning the 
Nuremberg Race Laws being within its domestic jurisdiction. See Ermacora, F.: Article 
2(7), in Simma, B. (ed.): The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford, 
1995. 141. 
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states calling for a respect of human rights prior to the use of force, but–as a 
result of the above-mentioned status of fundamental rights–these represen-
tations could be classified as “soft” interventions rather than disputes. It is also 
remarkable that the concept of dispute never really became manifest in the 
relevant literature. 
 This conclusion will only be partially altered if it is held that a dispute 
“likely to lead to a rupture” could indeed take place prior to an intervention 
concerning the respect for human rights, and could have been submitted for 
settlement to arbitration, to judicial settlement, or to enquiry by the Council. 
Due to the obligation to respect the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of states, it 
is doubtful that the Council could have actually dealt with the matter: 
 
“If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found 
by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, 
and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.”50 
 
 It was for the Council to determine what formed part of domestic juris-
diction, but it was not required to examine this issue ex officio, therefore any 
invocation of domestic jurisdiction took the form of an objection on the side of 
the state concerned. The basis of such decision by the Council was whether 
international law had a norm prescribing a state to perform a particular behaviour 
under given circumstances.51 What is more, the Covenant set a considerably 
strict condition for the application of the clause cited, as the matter must have 
been “solely” within the domestic jurisdiction, not “essentially” as under Article 
2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter.52 
 Resorting to the dispute settlement mechanism envisaged by the Covenant 
did not guarantee the actual prevention of war. States merely undertook the 
obligation of averting war in certain cases, so there remained a number of 
opportunities to wage war lawfully. The most evident reservation of ius ad 
bellum was incorporated in Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant: 
 
  
 50 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15, paragraph 8. For a similar conclusion, 
see Murphy, S. D.: Humanitarian Intervention. The United Nations in an Evolving 
World Order. Philadelphia, 1996. 59. 
 51 Cf. Buza, L.: A nemzetközi jog tankönyve [A Textbook of International Law] 
Budapest, 1935. 98. 
 52 Cf. Korowitz, M. S.: Some Present Aspects of Sovereignty in International Law. 
Recueil des Cours 102 (1961-I), 66–67. 
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“If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by 
the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves 
the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice.”53 
 
 This was, however, not the only gap in the system of collective security.54 
A recourse to war was legal in the following cases, as well: if a dispute was 
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states; if the arbitration or the 
judicial settlement was not concluded within a reasonable time, or the Council 
failed to present its report within six months after the submission of the 
dispute; if either of the parties to the dispute did not comply with the award by 
the arbitrators, the judicial decision or the report of the Council, and the three-
month cooling-off period expired; and–although it was not mentioned expressly 
in the Covenant–in exercise of the customary right of self-defence.55 In addition, 
the Covenant sought to avert war only between members of the League. If non-
members were also involved in a debate, they must have been “invited to 
accept the obligations of Membership in the League for the purposes of such 
dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just”.56 
 The utmost one can state with certainty regarding the relationship of the 
Covenant and humanitarian intervention is that such actions were, or rather 
would have been, unconditionally of interest to the League of Nations: 
 
“It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to 
bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance 
whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb inter-
national peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace 
depends.”57 
  
 53 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 15, paragraph 7. 
 54 The 1924 Geneva Protocol was meant to fill these gaps, thereby making the 
renunciation of war complete. The effort, however, resulted in failure owing to resistance by 
the United Kingdom and several other states. See e.g. Faluhelyi, F.: A párizsi Kellogg-
paktum és annak jelentősége [The Kellogg-Pact of Paris and Its Significance]. Kaposvár, 
1929. 5; Harris, H. W.: The League of Nations. London, 1929. 29; Wehberg, H.: Grund-
probleme des Völkerbundes. Berlin–Friedenau, 1926. 46–56. 
 55 See e.g. Dinstein, Y.: War, Aggression and Self-Defence. 3rd edition, Cambridge, 
2001. 76–77. 
 56 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 17. 
 57 Ibid., Article 11, paragraph 2. 
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 The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great 
Britain, and Italy–Annex A to the Pact of Locarno–is typically considered an 
important milestone in the process of the total renunciation of war, although its 
restricted scope and the limited number of parties make it appear less 
significant for the purposes of an analysis aimed at the drawing of conclusions 
of universal nature. In Article 2, Belgium and Germany as well as France and 
Germany mutually undertook that they “they will in no case attack or invade 
each other or resort to war against each other”. This provision, however, 
recognized three exceptions: the exercise of the right of legitimate defence; 
actions in pursuance of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; 
and measures resulting from a decision by the Assembly or by the Council of 
the League, or in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant, 
provided in the latter case that the resort to force was merely a response to an 
attack.58 The inclusion of “attack” and “invade” rendered the treaty an instru-
ment more progressive than the Covenant in the field of the renunciation of the 
use of force, and in all probability ruled out the chance of a lawful humani-
tarian intervention between the states concerned. 
 For various reasons, neither the Covenant nor the Pact of Locarno strove 
to impose a comprehensive and universal prohibition on the waging of war, 
unlike the Treaty on the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy–commonly known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact–signed in Paris, on 
August 27, 1928. The treaty is surprisingly short and formulates the general 
ban on war in one single sentence: 
 
“The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their 
respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national 
policy in their relations with one another.”59 
 
 Similarly to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact did not contain specific provisions concerning armed intervention, including 
humanitarian intervention. In support of the assumption that the Pact did not 
affect the lawfulness, if any, of intervention on grounds of humanity, one 
should simply recall the arguments detailed with respect to the Covenant. The 
  
 58 See Pact of Locarno, Annex A: Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, 
Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, Locarno, 16 October 1925, Article 2. For the 
text of the treaty, see Grenville–Wasserstein: op. cit., 145–147. 
 59 Treaty on the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Paris, 27 
August 1928, Article I. 
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treaty outlawed war, not the use of force. Furthermore, it merely renounced war 
“as an instrument of national policy”, but a humanitarian intervention, per 
definitionem, had to be free from selfish motives and direct national interests. 
However, due to the issue of human rights being within the domestic juris-
diction of states, it is dubious if the use of force for humanitarian purposes 
classified as war could be an instrument of international policy, and as such, a 
measure arguably not prohibited by the Pact. 
 As the treaty was meant to achieve a total prohibition of war, it is more 
likely that the phrase “war” contained therein embraced not only war in a 
formal sense, but also any use of military force against another state.60 It was 
the conclusion reached, for instance, by Ian Brownlie in the 1960s, who 
claimed that there had been only two implicit exceptions to the comprehensive 
renunciation of force: self-defence and measures taken in accordance with 
Article 16 of the Covenant.61 At first sight, this assertion is unquestionably 
convincing, but it does not seem to be unambiguously supported by past and 
present international lawyers. It has to be acknowledged that the number of 
contemporaneous authors accepting the lawfulness of humanitarian inter-
vention apparently decreased after World War I, but academics usually refrained 
from declaring all forms of the use of force illegal under the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact. For example, as Ferenc Faluhelyi stated a year after the conclusion of the 
treaty: 
 
“It appears worthy only of a remark that the statement of news articles, 
which emphasize in connection with the Kellogg Pact the total erasure of 
war from the dictionary of international law, is false. It is out of question.”62 
  
 60 Article II of the Pact providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes strengthens 
this supposition. Being the inverse of the prohibition of the use of force, and inseparable 
from that, this obligation may be construed as outlawing not only war but also all 
manifestations of forceful self-help. 
 61 See Brownlie, I.: International Law and the Use of Force by States. Oxford, 1963. 89. 
 62 Faluhelyi: op. cit., 11. (Translation mine.) For similar conclusions, see e.g. Brown, P. 
M.: Undeclared Wars. American Journal of International Law, 33 (1939), 540; Buza: A 
nemzetközi jog tankönyve. op. cit. 357; Wehberg: Die Völkerbundsatzung, 96. Even the 
address delivered by Aristide Briand before the signing of the Pact was phrased in a 
cautious manner: “It may now be appropriate to explain what is finally the essential 
feature of this pact against war. It is this: For the first time in the face of the whole world 
through a solemn covenant involving the honor of great nations, all of which have behind 
them a heavy past of political conflict, war is renounced unreservedly as an instrument 
of national policy, that is to say, in its most specific and dreaded form–selfish and wilful 
war. Considered of yore as divine right and having remained in international ethics as an 
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 Josef L. Kunz expressed an essentially similar view in 1951, but he also 
gave the grounds for that: 
 
“But the admitted legality of self-defense and the delegation to each state 
of the right to be the only judge to determine whether the conditions of 
self-defense exist, make this Pact practically only a restatement of general 
international law. […] Experience had shown that the Covenant and the 
Kellogg Pact, because of the aura of uncertainty hovering around the legal 
concept of “war”, made it possible to wage “wars in disguise.”63 
 
 Slightly more than two decades after the undertaking of the solemn 
obligation at issue, Kunz articulated an exceedingly critical opinion on the Pact 
labelling it as a mere “restatement” of general international law. His point 
can only be understood if one treats the current regulation of self-defence in-
dependent from its status under traditional international law. In the pre-Charter 
period, self-defence was far from being the category with strict limitations as 
we know it today. On the contrary, its content was broad and vague, as a result 
of which it was often barely separable from self-preservation, self-help or 
other lesser categories, such as reprisal, necessity, and even intervention. In 
addition, it could afford a legal basis even for an offensive action, provided 
that the danger triggering the measure was “instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”, and the state exercising this 
right “did nothing unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly 
within it”.64 Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that in some of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
attribute of sovereignty, that form of war becomes at last juridically devoid of what 
constituted its most serious danger–its legitimacy. […] Thus shall war as a means of arbitrary 
and selfish action no longer be deemed lawful.” Extracts from the speech of Aristide 
Briand, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Plenipotentiaries before Signing the 
Pact for the Renunciation of War, in The Paris Pact (Frank B. Kellogg pref.), 1934. 13–14. 
 63 Kunz, J. L.: Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale. American Journal of International 
Law, 45 (1951), 532–533. For concurring views in works published after 1945, see e.g. 
Dinstein: op. cit., 80; Jiménez de Aréchaga, E.: International Law in the Past Third of 
the Century. Recueil des Cours, 159 (1978-I), 87; Schwarzenberger, G.: The Funda-
mental Principles of International Law. Recueil des Cours, 87 (1955-I), 329; Stone: op. 
cit., 32; Waldock, C. H. M.: The Regulation of the Use of Force by States in Inter-
national Law. Recueil des Cours, 81 (1952-II), 473–474. 
 64 Parts of the diplomatic correspondence following the Caroline incident are quoted 
in Hall: op. cit., 324. 
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contemporary treatises humanitarian intervention and self-defence seem to 
have overlapped. 
 If the Kellogg-Briand Pact nevertheless outlawed humanitarian intervention, 
a dual regime was established–supposing, of course, that such interventions 
had been legal beforehand. As a consequence, this measure became unlawful 
for parties in their subsequent relations with one another, whereas in the 
relations of parties and non-parties as well as between non-parties, the 
customary law remained in force, whatever its exact content was. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the pre-Charter literature, the definition of humanitarian intervention 
valid for the period of traditional international law can be worded as follows: 
dictatorial interference involving the use of force, but not qualifying as war, 
carried out as a last resort and free from selfish motives by one or more civilized 
states against another state in absence of the consent or request thereof, with a 
view to coerce it to cease the grave and widespread violations of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights of its own nationals. Surprising as it may seem, but 
the submitted definition does not contain any referral to the question of legality. 
The reason for that is fairly simple–humanitarian intervention was not a generally 
accepted legal title. 
 To be able to draw a clear picture of the lawfulness of intervention on 
grounds of humanity in the pre-Charter era, the coexisting customary law has 
to be examined first. Having taken into account the relevant literature once 
again, it may be found that the teachings of international lawyers did not provide 
a definitive answer; moreover, nearly as many outstanding scholars considered 
humanitarian intervention lawful as those who explicitly rejected it. Similarly 
ambiguous results are reached following the analysis of rights of intervention 
based on treaty stipulations, a possible outlast of legality stemming from the 
doctrine of bellum iustum, the general principles of international law recognized 
by civilized nations, and the so-called ius ad bellum. Furthermore, as war and 
intervention were two separate categories of law, it is also extremely doubtful 
if the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, or the Kellogg-
Briand Pact affected the legality, if any, of humanitarian intervention. The 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee annexed to the Pact of Locarno, however, appears 
to have gone beyond these instruments in this respect, but its restricted scope 
as well as the limited number of its parties considerably decreases its relevance 
for the purposes of this study. 
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 In sum, a definitive conclusion pertaining to the lawfulness or unlawfulness 
of humanitarian intervention can scarcely be drawn. Both extremes are verifiable, 
but neither is absolutely and undoubtedly correct. If I nevertheless had to make 
a judgement on this issue, I would say that the spirit of 19th century inter-
national law stood close rather to the legality than to the illegality of such 
interventions, but this spirit gradually altered during the first half of the 20th 
century. Thus humanitarian intervention could well be presumed lawful in the 
1800s, but this presumption turned to the opposite in the years between the 
two World Wars65: a conclusion which, if correct, has serious implications on 
theories striving to demonstrate the present customary lawfulness of humani-
tarian intervention on the basis of the survival of an alleged traditional right 
thereof. 
 
 
  
 65 “We must, however, admit that the presumption is normally against such action 
and in support of the rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state.” 
Stowell, E.: Humanitarian intervention. American Journal of International Law 33 
(1939), 734. (Emphasis added.) On the other hand, several authors of the post-Charter 
era have stated that humanitarian intervention had been lawful under traditional 
customary law. Cf. e.g. Glahn, G., von: Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law. 5th edition, New York–London, 1986. 160; International Law 
Association: Report of the Fifty-Fourth Conference. The Hague, 1970. 598–99, 611; 
Lillich, R. B.: Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for 
Constructive Alternatives, in Moore, J. N. (ed.): Law and Civil War in the Modern 
World. Baltimore–London, 1974. 234–35; Reisman, W. M.–McDougal, M. S.: Humani-
tarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in Lillich, R. B. (ed.): Humanitarian Intervention 
and the United Nations. Charlottesville, 1973. 171. 
